The politics of automatic stabilization mechanisms in public pension programs by Weaver, Kent
www.ssoar.info
The politics of automatic stabilization mechanisms
in public pension programs
Weaver, Kent
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Weaver, K. (2011). The politics of automatic stabilization mechanisms in public pension programs. (Discussion
Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Bildung, Arbeit und
Lebenschancen, Abteilung Ungleichheit und soziale Integration, 2011-201). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-258634
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kent Weaver 
 
The Politics of Automatic Stabilization  
Mechanisms in Public Pension Programs* 
 
 
 
 
 
Kent Weaver 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., USA 
Email: kweaver@brookings.edu 
 
January 2011 
 
Order-No.: 
SP I 2011 – 201 
 
 
 
 
Research Area 
Education, Work, and Life Chances 
 
Research Unit 
Inequality and Social Integration 
 
http://www.wzb.eu/bal/usi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin 
http://www.wzb.eu 
di
sc
us
si
on
   
 p
ap
er
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The author would like to thank Luca Etter for excellent research assistance in 
preparing this working paper. 
 
 Abstract 
Demographic and fiscal pressures have increased pressures on governments in 
most wealthy countries to reduce the generosity of their public pension programs. 
Mechanisms that automatically adjust public pension levels to take account of fac-
tors such as increased life expectancy and slower economic growth are appealing to 
politicians because it saves them from having to take loss-imposing actions that are 
likely to incur political blame. This paper analyzes the financial and political poten-
tial of automatic stabilizing mechanisms (ASMs), beginning with a discussion of de-
sign issues and alternatives. This is followed by a discussion of potential adoption, 
implementation, and sustainability challenges for automatic stabilizing mechanisms 
and a review of experiences with stabilization mechanisms in three countries: Can-
ada, Sweden and Germany. The paper argues that ASMs are vulnerable to erosion 
over time, especially when the losses that the ASM would impose are substantial, 
and when elections are impending. Preserving the integrity of ASMs is most likely 
where the parties that initially supported their adoption continue to be able to sus-
tain cartel-like behavior with respect to pension policymaking. Overall, the analysis 
in this paper suggests that automatic stabilizing mechanisms are no panacea for the 
problems of countries facing serious long-term pension financing problems.  
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Introduction 
As populations age, almost all wealthy countries face increasing challenges to the 
sustainability of their retirement income policies. Policymakers dealing with re-
tirement income policy in advanced industrial countries face trade-offs among five 
major challenges. First and most basic is the demographic challenge of a declining 
ratio of workers to retirees. People are living longer and spending more years in 
retirement. Fertility rates have also declined dramatically, lowering entry into the 
labor markets just as aging Baby Boomers leave it in increasing numbers. A second 
challenge is the fiscal challenge of funding rising pension expenditures. The com-
mitments that almost all industrialized countries and many middle-income coun-
tries have made to provide public pensions to their citizens are likely to be unsus-
tainable in the medium to long-run—and some countries have already reached that 
point. The current economic slowdown in most industrialized countries has further 
exacerbated this fiscal pressure. Governments also face an adequacy, or senior well-
being challenge of maintaining the standard of living of current and future seniors 
and reducing remaining pockets of poverty among the elderly, although the nature 
of this challenge again varies across countries depending on the nature of the pen-
sion promise made to seniors and how those benefits are to be financed. 
Another key challenge in adapting to population aging concerns how to produce 
behavioral change--or more accurately, two behavioral challenges—without harm-
ing the most vulnerable segments of the population. The first involves extension of 
working lives, where feasible, to take account of longer life expectancy and reduce 
the decline in the ratio of workers to retirees. Workers in occupations that require 
hard manual labor clearly will have more difficulties in working longer than those 
holding jobs that are less physically demanding. These workers are also particularly 
likely to lack transferable skills that will allow them to transition into less physi-
cally demanding work. A second behavioral challenge is to increase savings for re-
tirement. As populations age, many governments will be forced to reduce the public 
pension commitments that they have made, which will place a larger burden on 
individual citizens to provide more for their own retirement. But they are unlikely 
to do so voluntarily—and many low-wage workers or those with interrupted work-
ing careers may be unable to do so under any circumstances.  
A final challenge is the political challenge of developing political mechanisms and 
processes that will allow the other challenges to be addressed in a politically sus-
tainable way (Myles and Pierson, 2001). Population aging means that retirement in-
come policymaking increasingly includes enactment of politically painful changes 
in pension programs (notably benefit cuts and increases in the age at which pension 
benefits are received). These changes promise few political rewards and risk sub-
stantial punishment from voters and powerful interest groups. Politicians may be 
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tempted to engage in political bidding wars at election time followed by backtrack-
ing or policy reversals. Moreover, there is a connection between the demographic 
challenge and the political challenge: as the population ages, so too does the elector-
ate. As a large share of voters are retirees and near retirees, pension issues rise in 
salience and the share of the electorate who fear being affected by near-term cuts 
increases. 
Governments clearly face a number of trade-offs in balancing those challenges. 
They also have multiple options in seeking a balance. They can, for example, in-
crease the standard retirement age at which workers become eligible for a “full” 
public pension benefit, and reduce benefits (or deny them entirely) for each month 
that a person retires before that new, higher age. Alternatively, governments can 
increase the number of years that a worker needs to have contributed to the pen-
sion system to earn entitlement to full benefits, or the years of earnings on which 
initial benefits are calculated (from an average of the highest fifteen years of earn-
ings to the highest thirty, for example, or the average of earnings in all years be-
tween ages eighteen and sixty-seven). They can change the way that past earnings 
are indexed for inflation in calculating initial benefits in ways that will make the 
initial benefit in an earnings-related pension less generous.  
There are two major political problems with all of these policy options, however. 
One key problem is that voters don’t like them: they impose concentrated and visi-
ble losses on identifiable groups of people. In response, politicians have developed a 
common set of blame-reducing strategies to use in reforming retirement income 
systems. They seek to make painful changes as invisible as possible, for example by 
employing technical changes in benefit formula that average voters may not under-
stand. They also try to delay the onset of negative impacts of policy changes (e.g., 
phasing in retirement age increases), preferably to a point in time beyond their cur-
rent term of office. And they try to deflect blame from themselves, for example by 
blaming past governments or developing mechanisms to share responsibility 
broadly across political parties. While this broad strategic repertoire can be seen 
across a variety of political systems, there are also important cross-national differ-
ences in politicians’ capacity to manage the trade-offs involved in retirement in-
come policy. Different policy “inheritances” and differing political institutions that 
must approve changes in retirement income policy both constrain policymakers’ 
options. 
These blame-reducing mechanisms still encounter another political problem, 
however: given uncertainties about future demographic and economic develop-
ments and politicians’ desire to avoid imposing any more losses on voters than ab-
solutely necessary, retrenchment is likely to have to be revisited repeatedly. Hence 
the political appeal of putting in place mechanisms that make unpopular pension 
adjustments automatically, without politicians having to “dirty their hands” in po-
litically damaging ways (Weaver, 1988). 
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Many forms of automatic stabilizing mechanisms (ASMs) in pension programs 
have been in place for a long time. Indexing the upper limit on income subject to 
pension payroll taxes for inflation or wage growth, for example, allows politicians in 
the United States and other countries to escape blame for legislating “tax increases” 
while keeping the share of total wages subject to payroll taxes relatively stable. 
Mechanisms explicitly designed to stabilize the finances of public pension systems 
are generally of more recent origin, reflecting adverse demographic shifts and 
slower economic growth in many countries since the early 1970s, combined with 
the political difficulties and risks involved in pension cutbacks.  
These newer mechanisms make automatic or semi-automatic adjustments to 
benefit levels and eligibility standards or revenues in public pension programs 
when triggers related to the current or anticipated fiscal health of the program are 
reached. Indeed a very weak stabilizing mechanism was enacted as part of the Social 
Security rescue package in the United States in 1983: it shifts cost-of living in-
creases from prices to the lower of wage or price increases when the main Social 
Security trust fund falls below twenty percent of annual program expenditures. This 
mechanism is not triggered until the Social Security funding crisis is immediate 
and severe. Nor does it have a very large impact once it is triggered. In Sweden’s 
new pension system, both initial pension benefits and later benefit adjustments for 
retirees are tied to both growth in the wage contribution base and changes in life 
expectancy. In Germany, the “demographic factor” enacted by the Kohl government 
in Germany in 1997 (and later withdrawn by the Schröder government) tied future 
pension levels to developments in life expectancy, while the “sustainability factor” 
enacted in 2004 included both demographic and employment considerations. 
Proponents of automatic stabilizing mechanism-based pension reforms argue 
that those reforms have several advantages in balancing the five challenges of re-
tirement income policy outlined above. Most importantly, ASMs address the fiscal 
challenge in contributory pension systems by facilitating a long-term balance be-
tween pension contributions and payouts. Moreover, they do so without exposing 
individuals to fluctuations in market returns and annuity prices found in pension 
systems based on defined contribution individual investment accounts. (Of course, 
individuals are exposed to risks of increases in life expectancy and poor economic 
growth rates that will almost certainly push benefits down and/or payroll tax rates 
up over the medium to long-term, exacerbating the senior welfare challenge.) Fi-
nally, because automatic stabilizing mechanisms are adaptations to existing, largely 
Pay-As-You-Go pension systems, they do not incur the transition costs of shifting to 
a funded defined contribution system; they can however be combined with such 
reforms so that as stabilizing mechanisms gradually cut the value of defined bene-
fits, those benefits are complemented with income from individual accounts. Nor do 
ASMs require the difficult policy choices regarding annuitization mechanisms that 
are associated with defined contribution individual account systems. 
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Automatic stabilizing mechanisms can also be helpful in meeting the political 
challenges associated with retirement income systems, with elements that make 
them appealing to both technocrats and politicians. For technocrats, ASMs offer the 
potential to increase fiscal discipline that is seen to be lacking in defined benefit 
pension plans that were enacted in an era in which the demographic challenge was 
much less severe. For politicians, automatic stabilizing mechanisms offer the pros-
pect that they will in the future be spared from having to enact politically painful 
benefit cutbacks and payroll tax increases.  
There is, however, a central contradiction in the political appeal of automatic sta-
bilizing mechanisms—a contradiction that has implications for the behavioral chal-
lenge (Brooks and Weaver, 2006). Technocrats like the signal sent to workers that 
working longer and saving more for retirement to receive a higher pension. The 
problem is that sending clear signals about how much slower growth and increased 
longevity is likely to reduce benefits when automatic stabilizing mechanisms are 
being considered may kill prospects for adoption of those mechanisms, since work-
ers are likely to object to those reductions, especially older workers who have lim-
ited time to adjust and blue-collar workers for whom working longer may be more 
difficult or even impossible. Politicians, on the other hand, are likely to be attracted 
to automatic stabilizing mechanisms precisely because making future benefit prom-
ises contingent on future economic and demographic developments may obscure 
the magnitude of future recipient losses vis-à-vis the policy status quo mechanisms. 
There are strong incentives for politicians not to be clear about the likely effects of 
introducing automatic stabilizing mechanisms for individual workers if they hope 
to succeed in adopting and sustaining that reform. But this in turn may undercut 
many of the hoped-for effects of those reforms on retirement and savings behavior.  
Automatic stabilizing mechanisms have other shortcomings as well. In particular, 
if the ASM freezes pension contribution rates and makes all adjustments on the 
benefit side, it may lead to substantial erosion of pension values as populations age. 
This may have particularly important consequences for the incomes of retirees with 
low life-time earnings; if benefits for this group are to be maintained above poverty 
levels, government may have to make substantial additional commitments to some 
form of minimum pension. Because minimum pensions are usually paid for from 
general government revenues rather than payroll taxes, such a solution may incur 
the wrath of the Ministry of Finance. 
As the discussion above suggests, there are many variations on automatic stabi-
lizing mechanisms. This paper analyzes the financial and political potential of auto-
matic stabilizing mechanisms, beginning with a discussion of design issues and al-
ternatives. Special attention is given to the most “complete” form of stabilizing re-
form, known as notional or non-financial defined contribution (NDC) pension sys-
tems (Holzmann and Palmer, 2006; Williamson, 2004). This is followed by a discus-
sion of potential adoption, implementation, and sustainability challenges for auto-
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matic stabilizing mechanisms. I then review experiences with stabilization mecha-
nisms in three countries―Canada, Sweden and Germany―that vary substantially in 
the scope, timing and automaticity of their stabilizing mechanisms, and discuss po-
tential lessons for policymakers in other countries. 
Design Issues and Options 
Automatic pension stabilization mechanisms differ on several key design parame-
ters. Various options for each of these parameters are shown in Table 1, with 
“stronger” provisions (i.e., those specifying or enabling more adjustment) generally 
shown first. 
A first dimension of automatic stabilizing mechanisms is whether the triggering 
mechanisms are projection-based or trend-based, or some combination of the two. 
Projection-based triggers utilize expected future trends on dimensions such as life 
expectancy, fertility, labor force participation, and real wage growth to project the 
financial solvency of a pension system over some specified period. Trend-based 
mechanisms base adjustments on real changes in factors such as the ratio of em-
ployed workers to retirees in the most recent year. These trend measures are usu-
ally measured over relatively short periods.  
Each of these mechanisms has distinctive advantages and disadvantages. Projec-
tion-based mechanisms rely on assumptions about future events (fertility and mi-
gration, life expectancy, labor force participation rates, productivity growth, etc.) 
that may or may not be accurate. Small differences in projections projected over a 
very long period can make substantial differences in the projected health of a pen-
sion system. Thus changing assumptions could lead to disruptions in pension pay-
ments if they act as policy triggers—disruptions that politicians will find difficult to 
justify if they involve lower payments. Moreover, politicians could be tempted to 
interfere in the assumptions and projections to avoid triggering benefit cuts or tax 
increases during an election year. They may also be accused of political interference 
even they have not done so. 
Trend-based mechanisms based on real data have problems of their own, how-
ever. Trend data may be subject to a high degree of volatility. Automatic stabilizing 
mechanisms that link benefit adjustments to the ratio of workers to retirees, for 
example, may be affected by short-term fluctuations in unemployment. Thus an 
improving employment situation might lead to a short-term rise in the ratio of 
workers to retirees, even when the long-term trend in the worker-retiree ratio is 
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expected to deteriorate markedly. Alternatively, a sharp contraction in employment 
could in theory trigger a nominal as well as real decline in pension benefits.  
A second—and perhaps the most critical—design issue is whether automatic 
stabilizing mechanisms are oriented toward preventing long-term-funding prob-
lems or simply to address immediate funding crises—a situation in which funding 
may not be available to send out the next month’s promised checks to pensioners. 
This dimension can be labeled “crisis-preventing” versus “crisis responding.” These 
mechanisms range from Sweden’s notional defined contribution pension, which is 
designed to make the system stable indefinitely, to the very weak mechanism found 
in the U.S. Social Security system, which triggers modest adjustments when the sys-
tem is about to run out of cash. Most pension stabilization mechanisms project a 
specified numbers into the year from the time the projection is made. Given rising 
life expectancy and declining fertility rates in most advanced industrial countries, 
demographic projections that are based on longer projection periods are almost cer-
tain to look bleaker, and each year’s projection is likely to look bleaker than the one 
that preceded it. Projections of Social Security and Canada Pension Plan solvency, 
for example, are historically made over a 75-year projection period. A mechanism 
that triggers programmatic changes based on this projection period would have to 
be more severe than those based on a shorter period.  
A third issue with respect to automatic stabilization mechanisms is the frequency 
of review. Countries that have annual reviews (and at least in theory, adjustments) of 
their pension systems are likely to require smaller adjustments with each review, 
making those adjustments less visible—for example, requiring only a freezing of 
benefit indexation rather than nominal benefit cuts. Lower visibility presumably 
makes such adjustments more politically feasible. On the other hand, annual ad-
justments will inevitably collide with elections, giving opponents of those adjust-
ments more political leverage to block them. Certainly very infrequent reviews, 
such as the once-a-decade review incorporated incorporated in Italy’s 1995 reform 
(Franco and Sartor, 2006), create potential problems of mandating very large cut-
backs that will in turn create huge pushback. 
A fourth issue in designing automatic stabilization mechanisms is the complete-
ness and speed of adjustment. Stabilization mechanisms may attempt to address all 
of the perceived shortfalls of a public pension system (whatever the projection pe-
riod) or just a part of it. Obviously, the more complete the adjustment, the more po-
litical opposition is likely to be roused—especially if the shortfall is large. Similarly, 
stabilizing mechanisms can vary in their speed of adjustment―mechanisms that 
require all adjustments to be made in a single year are more likely to be resisted 
than those that spread the adjustment over the course of five or ten years. In the 
case of benefit cuts, a speedy adjustment might require a (highly visible) cut in 
nominal benefit levels of current retirees while a slower one would require nominal 
Kent Weaver 
 
Page 13 
benefits to stay the same or rise slowly while the real value of benefits fell. The 
former is of course far more visible, and thus likely to spark more opposition. 
A fifth issue in designing stabilization mechanisms is the degree of automaticity 
of those mechanisms. The degree of automaticity is important because of the un-
popularity of pension cutbacks and tax increases: politicians may bravely pledge to 
commit future politicians (or themselves) to allowing unpopular adjustments to oc-
cur at some unknown future date, but they may be sorely tempted to renege and 
claim credit for preventing those unpopular benefit cuts or tax increases when the 
time actually arrives. Once again, a range of options is possible, ranging from very 
strong “fail safes” to much weaker “alarm bells.” The options shown in Table 1 are in 
declining order from most to least insulated. At the most insulated end, adjustment 
mechanisms can be protected by procedures that require legislative supermajorities 
or other hurdles stronger than those found in the normal legislative process (e.g., 
approval by a super-majority of provincial or state governments) to block the rec-
ommendations from going into effect. A mechanism that can be blocked or altered 
through normal legislative procedures to overturn stabilizing adjustments is less 
secure, especially in political systems that have (1) few veto points and (2) weak 
agenda control that does not allow political leaders to keep politically popular but 
fiscally irresponsible measures off the agenda. At the weaker end of the spectrum, 
“alarm bell” provisions make sure that an issue receives some attention but do not 
require substantial action by governments The annual report of the Social Security 
trustees in the United States is a very weak “alarm bell”—it calls attention to the 
long range funding shortfall, but government is not even required to explain its 
inaction, let alone present a plan for addressing it. 
A sixth critical parameter is the incidence of loss-imposition. The most important 
features include (1) the balance between expenditure reductions and revenue en-
hancement provisions in an automatic adjustment package, and (2) whether trig-
gered cuts on the expenditure side are targeted at future retirees (e.g., automatic 
increases in standard retirement ages as the population ages), current retirees (e.g., 
cutbacks in indexation of benefits for those already retired) or some combination of 
the two. Cutbacks to benefits through indexation freezes for the benefits of current 
beneficiaries are the “usual suspects” for benefit cuts, though there are other possi-
bilities. For example, the Danish government recently enacted automatic increases 
in the retirement age to match longevity increases beginning in 2025 (Social Secu-
rity Administration, International Update, July 2006, p. 1). On the revenue side, auto-
matic adjustments could be made to payroll tax rates, upper earnings thresholds for 
social security taxation, or both. Adjustments can also be made through some com-
bination of benefits and revenues. 
A final parameter involves protection from automatic cutbacks for low-income re-
tirees. It is possible to provide a strong poverty-preventing income floor for low-
income retirees through a minimum benefit in an earnings-related program or 
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through a separate means-tested program. Alternatively, low-income retirees may 
be subject to lower percentage cutbacks than others in an earnings-related pro-
gram. The latter situation will advance the affordability objectives of pension re-
form at the cost of senior well-being (adequacy) objectives. 
The Canada Pension Plan is a good example of how these parameters are com-
bined in practice. The CPP’s finances are reviewed every three years. When projec-
tions generated in that triennial review process show the CPP out of balance at end 
of a 60 year projection period, half of the deficit is supposed to be made up through 
reductions in future benefits for current retirees by trimming indexation, and half 
of the deficit through payroll tax rate increases. Both of these adjustments are 
phased in over a three year period. These automatic adjustments can be avoided if 
politicians explicitly decide through Cabinet order not to allow the changes to go 
into effect, or if they enact an alternative plan. But overall, the CPP adjustment 
mechanism can be characterized as a crisis-preventing (long projection period), 
comprehensive, highly automatic “fail-safe” of medium speed, that is highly bal-
anced between current retirees and current taxpayers in its imposition of costs. 
Other tiers of the Canadian pension system, Old Age Security and the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement, provide strong anti-poverty protection for most Canadian sen-
iors. 
The most comprehensive form of an automatic stabilization mechanism is what 
is known as the notional or non-financial defined contribution (NDC). Although 
many variants are possible, NDC pensions systems generally have the following 
characteristics: 
1. NDC benefit levels are based on earners’ lifetime contributions to the system, 
unlike defined benefit systems, which in most countries are based on some 
smaller number of peak earnings years; 
2. Benefits of both current and future retirees are automatically adjusted for 
changes in life expectancy as well as some measure of wage growth or over-
all economic growth. If life expectancy increases, or the economy performs 
poorly, benefits for current and future retirees are adjusted downward until 
anticipated total payouts and resources are brought back into balance;1 
3. Payroll tax rates are permanently fixed, and general revenues cannot be used 
to pay benefits. Thus NDC pensions make any automatic adjustments exclu-
sively on the benefit side;  
                                                
1  The exact calculation of these amounts can vary. In Sweden, the initial benefit includes an imputed 
rate of return based on expected real annual wage growth of 1.6 percent, giving retirees a higher 
initial benefit than would otherwise be the case. If real wage growth equals 1.6, full price indexa-
tion occurs. If real wage growth is higher or lower than this standard, inflation adjustments in the 
retirement annuity are adjusted upward or downward accordingly. See Palmer, “Swedish Pension 
Reform,” pp. 176-177, Sundén, “How Will Sweden’s New Pension System Work?,” p. 9, and Setter-
gren, 2001. 
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4. Like most defined benefit pension systems, they operate primarily on a Pay-
As-You Go (PAYG) basis. Sweden’s system uses “buffer funds” of past sur-
pluses to smooth spending across demographic peaks and valleys. 
Shifting from an earnings-related defined benefit pension system to an NDC-based 
pension system may have particularly important redistributive effects. In particular, 
such a shift may have severe consequences on individuals with interrupted and 
part-time participation in labor markets—characteristics that are especially associ-
ated with female workers.  
Political Issues 
Automatic stabilizing mechanisms pose a number of distinctive design choices, as 
outlined in the previous section and Table 1. But automatic stabilization mecha-
nisms, and specific options for their design, also need to be evaluated in terms of 
three criteria of a more political nature. First, there may be major obstacles to their 
adoption that undercut their potential utility. Second, problems may arise in the 
implementation process. Finally, there may be problems of politically sustainability 
if their opponents seek to erode the reform or reverse it outright. This section out-
lines the most important of those opportunities and challenges as well as possible 
strategic responses by policymakers (see Table 2 for a summary). The next section 
then examines how those issues played out in the experience of three countries.  
Adoption Issues 
Political constraints on adoption of automatic stabilizing mechanisms can be di-
vided into three categories: interest group opposition, norms about benefit entitle-
ment, and political institutions. All three of these constraints are likely to be barri-
ers in adopting automatic stabilizing mechanisms. The purpose of ASMs is to in-
crease the probability that some losses (benefit cuts, retirement age increases, tax 
increases or some combination) occur. Thus they are likely to encounter concen-
trated opposition from groups that benefit from current policy, notably seniors or-
ganizations and unions that represent workers in physically demanding professions 
who may have difficulty in working in their current occupations as they age.  
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Institutional obstacles to enacting ASMs obviously will vary greatly across politi-
cal systems, but as a general rule, systems that have multiple veto points and su-
permajority requirements at each approval point pose greater obstacles to any 
change from the status quo. Opposition parties are likely to face a difficult political 
trade-off in any decision to challenge adoption of an ASM, however: it is likely to be 
in their short-term interest to challenge adoption of the mechanism as a threat to 
senior incomes, but if they anticipate gaining power in the future, having an ASM 
already in place can save them the great political headache of explicitly making 
such cutbacks themselves. While this calculation will always be a complex-multi-
faceted one, the odds of being able to resist the siren’s call of blame-generating are 
probably weakest when (1) an election is near, and (2) the outcome of the election is 
uncertain but the opposition is likely to lose, so that blame-generating on pensions 
might make the difference turning defeat into victory. 
Finally, norms of benefit entitlement are usually deeply imbedded for most pen-
sion systems, although the young tend to be more skeptical that they can or will be 
kept. Automatic cutbacks may be perceived as unfair, especially to retirees and 
near-retirees who have little time to adjust their savings and labor supply. ASMs 
may also be perceived as an effort by government to avoid accountability. 
Three broad sets of strategies can be used by proponents of automatic stabilizing 
mechanisms to help win their adoption: adjusting payoffs, changing perceptions, 
and manipulating procedures (Pal and Weaver, 2003), as shown in Table 2. There are 
several ways to lessen the incidence of concentrated, visible losses associated with 
ASMs, including having long lead times so that current retirees and those about to 
retire are unaffected by cutbacks. Gradual phase-ins are also likely to lower the 
visibility of and opposition to automatic cuts or tax increases. And the most vulner-
able clienteles can be protected from the effects of ASMs by improving minimum 
benefits within a contributory pension system or a parallel income-tested tier. In 
the short-term, avoiding the first potential “triggered” adjustment until after the 
next election is an obvious step to avoid blame. 
To counter perceptions of unfairness, proponents of automatic stabilizing mecha-
nisms need to reframe the issue in terms of maintaining fiscal solvency for future 
generations if they are to generate support for those mechanisms. Framing the is-
sue as “taking decisions out of the hands of politicians” may also be useful. 
Options for managing procedures to help win adoption of ASMs are more limited. 
In almost all systems, legislative action will be required to put these mechanisms in 
place; there are few “venue-shopping” opportunities to bypass legislation. As will be 
discussed in the case studies, however, it is sometimes possible to utilize or create 
politically insulated decisionmaking procedures to formulate and build political 
support for automatic stabilization mechanisms that then make it easier to obtain 
formal legislative adoption. 
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Implementation Issues 
Automatic stabilizing mechanisms may encounter several problems in the policy 
implementation process. One problem that is likely to be present immediately after 
adoption is that the agency charged with implementing the proposal may lack the 
information and technical expertise (including use of technical demographic and 
economic forecasting models) needed to develop accurate projections of the magni-
tude of future pension funding burdens and adjustments needed to address funding 
shortfalls. Providing a substantial lead time, adequate funding, and expertise can 
help to avoid problems in initial implementation that may undercut support for 
keeping ASMs in place. 
A second potential problem with implementing ASMs is that politicians may 
pressure statistical agencies not to make projections that trigger politically unpopu-
lar benefit changes—for example, projections of increased longevity or low long-
term economic growth. Although this may not be a problem in countries where sta-
tistical agencies are well-established, highly professionalized, and enjoy a high de-
gree of independence, status, and deference, it could be a problem in countries 
where none of these things are true. In Argentina, for example, there have been 
widespread charges that the national statistical agency artificially suppressed infla-
tion figures for electoral purposes and to lower payments on inflation-indexed 
bonds and public sector wage negotiations (“Cooking the Books,” 2007; McDonnell, 
2007; Galak, 2007). Increasing the independence of agencies charged with calculat-
ing triggers or outsourcing production of data are two potential ways to head off 
this risk.  
Politicians may also be tempted to intervene to block or modify implementation 
of automatic adjustments once they have been announced. One possible way to head 
off this type of intervention is to phase in the effects of automatic adjustments over 
several years so that impacts are less visible and politicians are less tempted to in-
tervene. 
A fourth potential implementation issue in automatic stabilizing mechanisms is 
that program clientele may fail to adjust their behavior in ways that are consistent 
with programmatic changes. The issue is not obvious on its face: adjustments in 
pensions will occur without workers or pensioners doing anything. But that is pre-
cisely the problem: with automatic stabilization mechanisms in place, future public 
pension benefits are likely to be lower in the past for a given earnings history. 
Workers who do not adjust their savings and labor supply behavior to take account 
of this fact are likely to have an inadequate pension when they retire. As noted 
above, sending out clear signals about the anticipated magnitude of a reform’s ef-
fects on pension levels should enhance behavioral effects of an ASM, but doing so 
before a reform is enacted is likely to lower its prospects for adoption. Waiting to be 
clear about the anticipated magnitude of these effects until after the reform may 
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undercut this risk, but it also risks creating a (justifiable) backlash against both the 
reform and the politicians who enacted it.  
Sustainability2 
Until recently, political scientists have largely assumed that once major policy re-
forms were put in place, they would remain in place, though implementation might 
be problematic. Recent work by Eric Patashnik (2003, 2008) and others calls this 
assumption into doubt, however. Politicians may be reluctant to abolish ASMs en-
tirely, given the significant investments of time and political capital that are re-
quired to put them in place in the first place and their long-term blame-shielding 
advantages. But permanent erosion of automatic stabilizing mechanisms, undercut-
ting their effects, may occur—for example a shortening of a projection period, a 
shift from a full to partial adjustment for adverse democratic trends, or an exclusion 
of certain specific politically sensitive groups (e.g., members of the armed forces) 
from the effects of the mechanism. Having an automatic stabilizing mechanism in 
place does shift the bargaining leverage in favor of those who want those adjust-
ments to occur as scheduled, because preventing the mechanism’s reversal or ero-
sion requires them merely to block changes proposed by politicians or groups cater-
ing to short-term constituency interests rather than adopting new policies. This 
advantage is likely to be important (1) in political systems where the governing 
party or coalition has sufficient agenda control to keep reform-eroding proposals 
off the agenda , and (2) in systems with multiple veto points, where super-majorities 
are usually needed to move from the default position. But where agenda control is 
weak and where veto points are fewer and weaker, temptations for politicians to 
prevent visible loss-imposition on present and future retirees will remain strong. 
A full reversal of automatic adjustment mechanisms is probably most likely 
when there is a turnover in the party of government, and a party that was never 
committed to that mechanism takes over the reins of power. But an erosion to avoid 
short-term political losses will be a temptation for blame-avoiding politicians 
whenever the mechanism is triggered, especially if it appears likely that a high 
probability that several politically painful iterations are likely to follow in the near 
future. Thus economic downturns, which may trigger a short-term government fis-
cal crisis as well as lowering contributions to a pension system, are likely to be con-
tributing conditions to any challenge to an ASM that is already in place, because the 
benefit cuts triggered during a downturn are likely to be bigger and thus more visi-
ble than during good times. 
 
                                                
2  This section draws on Brooks and Weaver, 2006. 
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Country Experiences 
As Table 3 shows, advanced industrial countries utilize a variety of automatic stabi-
lizing mechanisms ranging from Sweden’s comprehensive NDC system to the very 
weak Social Security failsafe in the United States. These mechanisms are generally 
used in contributory systems where at least a rough balance is anticipated over 
time between contributions and payouts. 
Canada 
Canada has a complex public pension system in which multiple tiers play a signifi-
cant role. Canada has both a large quasi-universal (benefits are “clawed back” for 
very high income individuals) flat-rate pension tier, known as Old Age Security 
(OAS) and a large income-tested tier, called the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS). 
Both of these programs are financed through general revenues. In addition, the Can-
ada Pension Plan (CPP), a contributory social insurance plan pays benefits linked to 
an individual's contribution history. An opting-out clause allows Quebec to operate a 
distinct Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) in that province, with contribution rates and eli-
gibility and benefit levels in the CPP and QPP kept harmonized.  
Fiscal pressures led the Canadian government to consider retrenchment and re-
structuring of the Old Age Security program on several occasions in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Throughout each of these rounds of retrenchment in OAS, the Can-
ada/Quebec Pension Plan remained untouched. It was not for lack of underlying 
problems: The financial condition of the CPP was deteriorating as a result of declin-
ing economic and demographic conditions, a number of benefit enhancements en-
acted in the 1970s, and a dramatic increase in takeup of disability benefits (the CPP 
provides disability as well as retirement and survivors benefits) in the 1980s and 
1990s.3 As a result, cash flow from contributions (i.e., contributions minus expendi-
tures) in the CPP turned consistently negative beginning in fiscal year1984-85), and 
in 1993, overall CPP assets began to decline (that is, contributions plus interest 
payments were no longer adequate to pay benefits). The CPP's Chief Actuary esti-
mated in 1995 that the CPP trust fund would be exhausted by the year 2015, and 
that with an empty trust fund, the contribution rate needed to finance contributions 
                                                
3  Benefit enhancements included full indexation of benefits rather than just for inflation over 2 
percent in 1975, dropping retirement and earnings tests for persons aged 65 to 69 in 1975, and 
addition of child-rearing drop-out provisions in 1987. Overall, these benefit enhancements were 
estimated to add costs of 2.4 percent of contributory earnings to the program. Fed-
eral/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat, 1996, chapter 3. 
The Politics of Automatic Stabilization Mechanisms in Public Pension Programs 
 
Page 20 
on a pay as-you-go basis would have to reach 14.2 percent by the year 2030 (Office 
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, 1997). 
Despite these financial problems, the difficulty of securing provincial assent 
helped to keep CPP cutbacks from even getting on the agenda for a number of years: 
it doesn't pay to go out in front on an issue where resolution in the absence of a 
crisis is very doubtful, and where it is almost certain that at least some provincial 
ministers as well as the federal opposition parties would use the occasion to de-
nounce the federal government in a high-profile setting.  
Declining trust fund balances, eroding public confidence in the CPP, and growing 
awareness that a failure to address the CPP's problems quickly would lead to soaring 
contribution rates in the future finally led to an initiative by Ottawa in 1995 to alter 
the program(Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat, 1996; See 
also Prince, 2003; Little, 2008). Ottawa and eight of ten provinces reached agreement 
in 1997 on a package of CPP changes that distributed pain among all parties. With 
the political cover provided by the federal provincial agreement and a single party 
majority government in Ottawa, Parliament approved the changes, and they went 
into effect in 1998. 
The most visible change in the CPP rescue package--and the one with the biggest 
fiscal impact--was in payroll taxes (see Slater and Robson, 1999). Tax rates on em-
ployers and employees rose from 5.85% to 9.90% (shared equally between the two) 
over a six year period to finance a move away from Pay-As-You-Go toward partial 
advance funding of the CPP. Politicians sold the CPP payroll tax increase as a meas-
ure that would prevent payroll taxes from having to go as high as previously pro-
jected if the CPP contribution rate was not changed quickly. Moreover, the initial tax 
increase was not scheduled to be felt until 1998, after the next federal election.4 
Cuts in CPP retirement benefits were, not surprisingly, made much harder for bene-
ficiaries to discern and understand.5 
Little noticed at the time the legislation was passed, but potentially of great im-
portance in the longer run, the new CPP legislation also put in place a new "default" 
or fail-safe procedure for ensuring the long-term financial viability of the CPP. In 
the future, the chief actuary for the CPP was to prepare estimates of the long-term 
financial sustainability of the Plan. Over the next year, Ministers from Ottawa and 
the provinces are supposed to agree on any needed changes to keep the plan viable; 
if they do not agree, contribution rates will increase automatically to meet half of 
                                                
4  In fact, the initial tax increase--from 5.85 to 6.0% of payroll, was retroactive to January 1997, but 
was not to be paid until income tax time in the spring of 1998 (Ferguson, 1997).  
5  Just over one quarter of the reduction in the overall projected long-term 4.0 percent of payroll in 
the CPP/QPP contribution rate required to achieve long-term funding stability came on the benefit 
side, largely through technical changes to formulas that are almost incomprehensible to most 
beneficiaries. For a summary of the financial impact of the benefit changes in the 1997 CPP reform 
package, See Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Office of the Chief Actuary, 
1997, pp. 6-8. 
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the anticipated deficiency (phased in over three years), and indexation of the CPP 
will be frozen for the next three years.6 This procedure could be overridden by 
Cabinet order, but it would take affirmative action to do so.  
The revised statute has several important implications. It created a strong proce-
dural presumption, and sent a strong signal to beneficiaries and contributors, that 
the CPP would be kept fiscally sound: its fail-safe trigger kicks in when the long-
term viability of the plan is in question, not just when the plan is in immediate dan-
ger of not being able to pay out benefits. Moreover, the pain of a future CPP fix will 
be shared equally between taxpayers (through contribution rate increases) and cur-
rent beneficiaries (through benefit freezes) unless federal and provincial finance 
ministers can agree on an alternative. The “clean hands" default procedure estab-
lished by the statute allows losses to be imposed on beneficiaries and contributors 
without politicians having to do anything--although the concentration of account-
ability in Canada's Westminster political system means that there would be pressure 
on a future Cabinet to avoid blame for loss imposition by cancelling contribution 
increases and indexation freezes.  
A final impact of the new statute was that by turning the highly inexact science 
of long-term actuarial projections into a policy trigger for imposing painful in-
creases in contribution rates and indexation freezes, it increased the probability 
that those projections would be the subject of future political conflict. And shortly 
before the first Chief Actuary's report was due under the new law, the Chief Actuary 
was fired. The fired Chief Actuary, Bernard Dussault, charged that he had been pres-
sured by Finance Ministry officials to change his assumptions after preliminary es-
timates suggested that a small (0.1% of payroll) increase in the contribution rate 
would be needed to keep the CPP solvent in the long term. The Chrétien government 
argued strongly, if not very convincingly, that Dussault's firing had nothing to do 
with his conclusions (Eggertson, 1998; Jack, 1998a and 1998b; Jack, 1999; see also 
the discussion in Little, 2008). The consultant commissioned to complete Dussault's 
report, using a set of assumptions that were questioned by some critics as too opti-
mistic, produced a report showing that the system was in fact slightly (0.1% of pay-
roll) over-financed. The issue soon faded, however, and later actuarial reports, 
which have shown the system in surplus at the end of the 75 year projection period, 
have not spawned controversy. Nor have Canadian politicians faced a “when push 
comes to shove” situation of being forced to let unpopular benefit cuts and payroll 
tax rate increases go into effect.  
Canadian experience thus suggests several lessons. One is that it is possible to 
win enactment of a fairly stiff fail-safe device that combines a lengthy time horizon 
for financial viability projections, a series of “default” policy changes split between 
                                                
6  See Canada Pension Plan, Chapter C-8, Consolidated Statutes of Canada, sections 113-115 and Stat-
utes of Canada, Chapter C-40 (Bill C-2), sections 94-6, and Slater and Robson, Building a Stronger Pil-
lar, pp. 6-7. 
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payroll tax increases and indexation freezes that go into effect in the absence of an 
agreement between politicians, and an action-forcing mechanism that allows politi-
cians to devise an alternative to default changes within a specified period of time. In 
the Canadian case, the fact that the negotiation process for any changes in the 
CPP/QPP involved a “behind closed doors” process of negotiation among federal and 
provincial finance ministers, followed by a ratification process in a Westminster-
style parliament where single-party majorities are the norm, undoubtedly eased the 
policy adoption process. 
With respect to implementation, the hints of possible political interference in the 
first actuarial assessment of CPP suggest that such interference is a real risk, al-
though nothing comparable have occurred since. And since the expectation of both 
policymakers and the public is that the failsafe will not be used, no clear behavioral 
signals on the need to work longer and save more for retirement have been sent or 
received by the ASM. Finally, Canadian experience suggests the not very surprising 
lesson that it if a mechanism is not activated (and thus never produces visible 
losses), it is unlikely to spark opposition that leads to its reversal or erosion. 
Sweden 
Sweden is often seen as the quintessential welfare state.7 The Social Democratic 
Party, which was in power (though usually in a minority government or in coalition) 
for all but nine years of the period from 1932 to 2006, was the guiding force shap-
ing expansion of the Swedish welfare state. For most of the first eighty years of the twen-
tieth century, the story of the Swedish pension system was largely one of expansion—albeit 
frequently contentious expansion (see Heclo, 1974). By the late 1960s, the public 
pension system in Sweden consisted of three tiers. A flat-rate basic pension (folk-
pension) operated on as Pay-As-You-Go basis. An earnings related national supple-
mentary pension (ATP), enacted in 1959 and widely regarded as the “jewel in the 
crown” that had helped to solidify middle class support for the Social Democratic 
welfare state (Lundberg, 2003), was partially pre-funded. Both tiers were financed 
largely by earmarked employer contributions.8 A means-tested pension supplement 
was created in 1969 to provide a higher pension floor whose earnings-related bene-
fits were very low. The pension supplement, in combination with the other two 
tiers, moved almost all seniors in Sweden out of poverty. 
                                                
7  This section of the paper draws on collaborative work with Karen Anderson. 
8  In 1990, the basic pension contribution (7.45% of payroll) financed 85% of benefits for the flat rate 
pension; the rest was financed from general revenues. Employer contributions of 13.5% of payroll 
to the earnings-related pension financed both current benefits and an accumulation of savings in 
the AP funds. 
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By the 1980s, several problems with the Swedish pension system were becoming 
evident. Funding the pension system through payroll taxes was becoming increas-
ingly problematic due to slower economic growth and an aging population.9 Succes-
sive Swedish governments responded to the pension crisis on three tracks: through 
a number of ad hoc incremental changes in pension programs; through efforts to 
restrict early retirement among Swedish workers; and through efforts to bring 
about more fundamental changes that would stabilize financing and benefits for the 
long term and therefore keep pensions from becoming a recurrent (and divisive) 
item on the policy agenda (see Anderson and Immergut, 2007: 367-372). 
Several elements of the “third track” process through which Sweden moved to-
ward a fundamentally restructured pension system are worth stressing here. First, 
the process was accelerated by the election of a four-party “bourgeois” (i.e., non-
Social Democratic) minority government in 1991 that faced a severe economic and 
budgetary crisis and lacked a parliamentary majority. Second, there was a strong 
effort by the new government to develop a mechanism and a proposal that could 
obtain broad support from parties in the Swedish parliament across the dividing 
line between bourgeois parties and parties of the left. Failure to do so would mean 
both that any reform might be at risk when the Social Democrats, still by far the 
largest party in Sweden) returned to power. Third, the process was dominated by 
politicians and experts. Unions and employers (“social partners” in European par-
lance) were not directly involved in the negotiations, which participants in the ne-
gotiations believe helped to facilitate an agreement. 
The pension working group comprised of members of the four bourgeois gov-
ernment coalition partners and the Social Democrats (but not the smaller Left or 
New Democracy parties) issued their first report in August 1992, including a sketch 
of proposed principles for reform and a comprehensive report in 1994. The working 
group continued its work after the Social Democrats returned to power in Septem-
ber 1994, and most of the implementing legislation was enacted by 1998. 
The new pension system had several major characteristics, including a perma-
nently fixed contribution rate for Swedish pensions, the addition of a relatively 
modest (2.5 percent of payroll) mandatory defined contribution tier to the Swedish 
pension system, and a new income-tested “guarantee pension” financed from gen-
eral revenues to replace the former pension supplement.10  
For our purposes, however, the key change was replacement of the former flat-
rate pension and earnings-related pension by a new “income pension” based on 
                                                
9  The design of the earnings-related ATP system assumed a stable annual economic growth rate of 
3-4 % and full employment if contribution rates were to remain stable. See Anderson and Immer-
gut, 2007: 373. See also the discussion in Palme and Svensson, 1999, and Palmer, 2002: 186-187. 
10  The guarantee pension requires far more resources than the pension supplement since it took over 
much of the function of supporting very low income pensioners who had previously received the 
flat-rate pension. 
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what came to be called Notional or Non-Financial Defined Contribution (NDC) princi-
ples. With NDC, no promises would be made about the level of benefits in relation to 
an employee’s final salary or to the level of income for a specific number of earn-
ings-years. Benefits are based on contributions (which may include contributions 
made on a person’s behalf by the state, for example for periods of unemployment or 
child-caring) over the entire course of their working life.11 
In terms of stabilizing pension system finances, the key feature of the new NDC 
pension tier is an “automatic balancing mechanism” that uses a complex formula to 
correct for increases in life expectancy and slow wage growth by lowering initial 
benefits (for those who have not yet retired) and benefit indexation (for retirees) 
until the system comes back into balance. The new income pension also took over 
most of the “buffer funds” from the old earnings-related pension, and balances in 
individuals’ notional accounts includes a share of buffer fund balances as well as 
their own contributions. Because the balancing mechanism makes all corrections in 
the year after data is finalized (e.g., at the beginning of 2010 for changes that oc-
curred in 2008), as well as demographic and wage growth trends, there is a potential 
for significant swings in benefits during periods of unusual economic decline. 
Several aspects of the more fundamental reform enacted in the 1990s contrib-
uted heavily to its adoption―indeed make it a masterpiece of political blame-
avoidance. First, the reform package is extraordinarily complex and many of its spe-
cific provisions are quite opaque. Benefits under the income pension and premium 
pension depend in part on long-term trends, including the performance of the 
Swedish economy, performance of investment funds that hold pension fund sur-
pluses, and demographic trends, for which politicians are unlikely to be held fully 
accountable. The balancing mechanism allows reductions to occur without politi-
cians having to take direct, visible actions, and generally accrue slowly over a long 
period of time. Thus it is difficult for most voters to conceptualize the impact of the 
various budgetary fail-safes in the “notional defined contribution” tier of the new 
pension system and to develop a clear sense of how much, if at all, that their pen-
sions will be lower in the future. It is also difficult for potential partisan opponents 
of the reform to articulate a clear and convincing critique of it that voters can easily 
understand—at least until cutbacks have or are about to be triggered.  
Trying to avoid perceptions that the reform would cause widespread losses was a 
fundamental objective for negotiators. Indeed the final package was sold as having 
the potential to yield a pension equivalent to that under the current system—at 
least for those who worked steadily for forty years, if there were no further in-
creases in life expectancy over that prevailing in 1994, and making optimistic but 
                                                
11  Pensions are indexed to developments in real wages rather than prices. Rather than simply raising 
the “standard” retirement age, the new pension system sidestepped the retirement age issue en-
tirely by setting a flexible retirement age between 61 and 67, with increased incentives for con-
tinued work. 
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plausible estimates of overall economic growth (2 percent annually) and returns on 
the individual account tier included in the final package (Sweden, Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs, 2002: 23; Settergren, 2003). However, projected life expectancy 
increases after 1994 had made the idea that pension replacement rates would re-
main stable obsolete by the time implementing legislation for the new NDC pension 
was adopted. 
The complexity of the reformed pension system created opportunities to com-
pensate those negatively affected by the new lifetime earnings principle. In particu-
lar, the introduction of pension rights for higher education and child rearing (with 
contributions made by the national treasury) helped to mitigate losses from profes-
sionally trained workers who had spent many years in higher education and from 
women who had reduced work effort when raising children. Many of the more tech-
nical aspects of the proposed reform, such as the introduction of a life expectancy 
index and a new post-retirement inflation index were shielded from criticism by 
the shear complexity of the package. The guarantee provided to the “early transi-
tion” generation of retirees also lowered the prospects for political opposition. 
Moreover, increasing the linkage between social insurance pension benefits and 
contributions allowed politicians to claim that the new system was more “fair.” This 
helped to defuse opposition from those who would stand to lose in the new system. 
All of this meant that politicians were unlikely to incur voter retribution for sup-
porting cuts in pension obligations.  
Sweden also offers some lessons in how to (and how not to) frame proposals for 
automatic stabilizing mechanisms. The mechanism used to lower benefits in the 
Swedish NDC system was originally referred to as the “brake.” That terminology was 
discarded by reform proponents because it was seen to give the politically unattrac-
tive (although accurate) message that it was likely to lower future benefits. The less 
alarming term “automatic balancing mechanism” was substituted (“balance” is, after 
all, generally considered to be good thing), although the term “brake” is still used in 
common discourse. 
Swedish experience also provides lessons regarding the provision of clear signals 
about the scope for potential for cutbacks under automatic stabilizing mechanisms. 
Swedish workers receive annual statements that project their future pension bene-
fits under three separate retirement ages (Sweden’s new retirement system has 
moved away from a standard retirement age to a flexible retirement age between 61 
and 67), as well as two projections of economic growth. The retirement age projec-
tions provide clear information about future benefits, though not as clear a signal as 
an increase in the retirement age. Nor is it clear how much attention workers pay to 
projections about different rates of economic growth—a factor about which general 
information levels are low. If many workers do not alter their behavior, they will 
end up with inadequate pensions. Effective retirement ages have indeed increased 
under the new pension regime. However, it is not clear that increased effective re-
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tirement ages are the result of the pension statements and the limited information 
on potential for future automatic cutbacks that they provide. 
One very notable feature of Swedish implementation of its new pension system 
is that the pension working group established to design the system has been main-
tained in a modified form after the new system was established. This mechanism 
facilitates resolution of conflicts as new issues arise during implementation. Equally 
important, it helps to sustain commitment to the pension system and to collabora-
tive solutions when problems arise. 
The most serious problem that Sweden has faced in implementing its “automatic 
balancing mechanism” arose with the worldwide financial crisis and recession that 
began in 2008 (see Kruse, 2009; Settergren, 2010). Sweden’s NDC pension system is 
particularly vulnerable to disruption because the solvency of the system is calcu-
lated based not only on the basis of economic growth and lifeexpectancy, but also on 
the value of accumulated contribution surpluses that are held in five “buffer funds.” 
These funds invest heavily in volatile investments in Sweden and overseas. The fi-
nancial crisis and recession led to a decline in the value of the assets held by those 
funds of 194 billion kronor at the end of 2008, or more than 21 percent. This was 
expected to lead to a 3.28 reduction in income pension benefits in 2010, though low 
income retirees would be protected by an increase in the guarantee pension 
(Forsäkringskassan, 2009: 43.). Would the stabilizing mechanism hold up under such 
pressure, especially with a general election scheduled for September 2010? A for-
mer Social Democratic Finance Minister suggested injecting 200 billion kronor in 
general revenues into the pension system to prevent triggering the “brake,” asking 
“are the five parties behind the pension arrangements ready to go to the polls on 
this, with all the opportunities for other parties—inside and outside parliament—to 
propose measures that would seem far more attractive to 1.6 million pensioners?” 
(Åsbrink, 2008) Sweden’s Minister of Social Affairs suggested additional possibilities, 
including compensating retirees from the state budget. After receiving expert input 
from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, the matter was referred to the multi-
party working group representing the five parties that had agreed to the original 
1990s pension reform package. The working group agreed to a change that would 
base the activation of the automatic balancing trigger on buffer fund balances aver-
aged over three years. Thus any benefit cuts that were made in benefits based on 
swings in the buffer fund balances were likely to be moderated over time—phasing 
in more slowly, but also rebounding more slowly during stock market upturns. 
Overall, the experience of the first major “pothole” of the Swedish NDC system 
suggest substantial resilience rather than high vulnerability to erosion or reversal. 
While the five parties that belong to the pension group rejected the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency’s recommendation, the change that they endorsed is consistent 
with the principles of their original agreement by not injecting new money into the 
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system. It is at least arguably an improvement because it weakens the measure’s 
volatility.  
The cartelistic behavior of the five major parties (Moderates, People’s/Liberals, 
Center and Christian Democrats in the “bourgeois” bloc and Social Democrats on the 
left) in the Pensions Working Group in defense of a modestly revised ASM status quo 
has remained intact, despite the rise of a new rightist anti-immigrant populist 
party, the Sweden Democrats. The Sweden Democrats prepared a television adver-
tisement for the September 2010 election which explicitly criticized the cost of ser-
vices to immigrants and said that Sweden faced a choice between an “immigration 
brake” and the “pension brake.” (Sweden’s commercial broadcaster refused to carry 
the ad, but it was widely circulated on the internet and discussed in the print media) 
(Brown, 2010). The Sweden Democrats won enough votes to put them over Sweden’s 
4 percent threshold and enter the Riksdag, and they held the balance of power when 
neither the bourgeois parties nor the left parties (the Social Democrats, Greens and 
Left Party) won a majority of seats. However, the center-right parties formed a mi-
nority government and refused to bargain with the Sweden Democrats. Thus the 
multi-party “cartel” backing the NDC system remains intact. Its automatic balancing 
mechanism, while modified in details, remains largely unchallenged in its broad 
principles. 
Germany 
Germany, like Sweden, has a long-established public pension system (See for exam-
ple Hering, 2008; Anderson and Meyer, 2003; Hinrichs, 2005; Schulze and Jochem, 
2007; Busemeyer, 2005, Schludi, 2005; Jacobs, 2009). Germany’s system differs from 
Sweden’s in having relied almost exclusively on a single contributory social insur-
ance tier for its public pension system. But Germany has faced a particularly serious 
demographic challenge of a rapidly aging population. German reunification exacer-
bated the financing pressure on the pension system as inefficient East German in-
dustries were shut down and many of those workers took early retirement. By the 
late 1990s, contribution rates were approaching 20 percent, and were expected to 
rise much higher in the future if no action was taken. Moreover, Germany’s pension 
system is financed in part by federal government subsidies from other revenue 
sources (notably the VAT and more recently ecology taxes); these expenditures were 
also growing, putting an added strain on the general budget.12 
Germany’s demographic and financial challenges have been exacerbated by a se-
ries of political challenges, notably a changing party system. Germany’s long-
                                                
12  In 2007, the federal grant covered 28.5 percent of the expenditures of the pension insurance sys-
tem (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008) 
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standing “two and a half” major players (the Christian Democrats/Christian Social 
Union, Social Democrats, and Free Democrats) were joined successively by the 
Greens in the 1980s and the Party of Democratic Socialism (later Left Party, Die 
Linke) in the 1990s. And it was not just the number of the parties that was changing. 
The Free Democrats moved to the right of the CDU/CSU from their traditional role as 
median party that could form a coalition with either of the larger parties. The PDS 
positioned itself as an intransigent defender of the welfare state status quo, and was 
seen as “uncoalitionable” because of its Communist past: this freed it from concerns 
about the practicalities of governing. These changes made it more difficult to build a 
broad cross-party consensus in favor of proposals of measures that would cut back 
on spending commitments—especially for the SPD, which now faced a credible 
party challenger on its left. Equally important, a more complex party system meant 
that maintaining commitment to such changes would also be more difficult once 
measures were in place and actual cutbacks were imminent because there were 
strong incentives to defect from any retrenchment-supporting party cartel in 
search of votes.  
Changes in the party system not only complicated coalition building in develop-
ing policy proposals and passing them in the lower legislative chamber, the 
Bundestag, they also created more uncertainty in the Bundesrat, where the govern-
ments of Germany’s länder are unrepresented. The Bundesrat has a veto over 
changes in the financing provisions provisions of the pension system, although not 
provisions that relate solely to benefits. Because Bundestag elections are not syn-
chronized with elections to the länder, changes in the composition of the Bundesrat 
as a result of land elections could derail government pension financing initiatives 
unless broad agreement was reached across party lines. Moreover even govern-
ments in the länder that mirrored the coalitional arrangements in the center could 
not necessarily be counted on to back such legislation proposals. 
Responses to the German pension system’s demographic and financial crisis ini-
tially focused on increased financing (notably contribution rate rises) and then ad 
hoc benefit and eligibility cutbacks. This process was characterized by a broadly 
consensual approach in which social policy experts from the major parties as well 
as employers and trade unions formulated policy responses within a relatively 
closed and depoliticized policy network which “after a joint learning process, usu-
ally resulted in compromises acceptable for all actors involved.” (Hinrichs, 2005: 54; 
see also Hering, 2008).  
By the mid-1990s, however, consensual policymaking had broken down under 
the strain of multiple pressures, notably slow job growth and increased takeup of 
early pensions as a result of firm closures in the former East Germany. The break-
down of consensual policymaking delayed response to pension crisis and made pol-
icy reversals more likely. 
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The collapse of consensual pension policymaking in Germany was clearly evident 
in legislation enacted in 1997.13 The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition government headed by 
Helmut Kohl attempted to address the severe financial and demographic challenges 
confronting Germany’s pension regime by developing a comprehensive reform 
package. The Social Democrats, anticipating a federal election in 1998, refused to 
collaborate, so the governing parties proceeded on their own. The 1997 legislation 
included a “demographic factor” that would automatically lower benefits as life ex-
pectancy rose. Targets were also set for both near-term and longer-term caps on 
payroll tax rates.  
Reflecting the more partisan atmosphere of pension policymaking in Germany in 
the late 1990s, the “demographic factor” was abolished after a new Social Democ-
ratic-Green coalition came to power in 1998, while proceeds from an eco-tax were 
dedicated to the pension system with the objective of stabilizing the contribution 
rate (Hering, 2008: 172). After a prolonged debate, a small new quasi-mandatory tax-
advantaged and subsidized individual account tier was enacted in 2001 to compen-
sate for planned future declines in public system replacement rates. At the same 
time, the new law introduced a “Riester factor” into the calculation of both current 
and future retirees that ostensibly compensates for a partial shift from public to 
private pension schemes (though this is of course purely fictitious for current retir-
ees). For current retirees, the practical effect of the Riester factor was supposed to 
be annual adjustments 0.5 percent below what they would otherwise be every year 
for between 2003 and 2010, reaching a total of 5 percent (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2008). This is not a statistically based automatic stabilizing mechanism like the 
demographic factor, but an ad hoc cut with similar effects justified with the fig leaf 
of an increasing role for voluntary private pensions. 
After a very narrow victory in the 2002 election, the Schröder Red/Green gov-
ernment also enacted a major pension reform in 2004 that included a new auto-
matic stabilizing mechanism to replace the “demographic factor” that the SPD had 
revoked after coming to power in 1998. This new stabilizing mechanism was re-
branded under the new label of “sustainability factor” (Nachhaltigkeitsfactor) to make 
it more politically palatable. It was also designed to lower replacement rates over 
time, stabilizing the contribution rate. However, in response to opposition from 
trade unions and the left-wing of the SPD, the impact of the sustainability factor 
was capped: it could not cause pensions for workers with a full earnings history to 
fall below a 46 percent replacement rate. 
The main difference between the demographic factor and the sustainability fac-
tor is that the latter is based on the actual ratio of pension contributors to benefici-
aries, while the demographic factor was based mainly on demographic projections. 
The sustainability factor does not just reduce pension benefits as life expectancy 
                                                
13  For detailed discussion of the electoral calculations involved in the 1997 reform inside and outside 
the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, see Schulze and Jochem, 2007, pp. 682-686. 
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rises, but is rather based on the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries and thus in-
cludes developments in fertility, migration, and changes in labor force participation. 
As the government appointed Rürup Commission summarized it, “The sustainability 
factor has a self-stabilizing function, because it automatically responds to shifts in 
demography and employment: It increases pensions in the case of increase in em-
ployment and reduces them if the number of beneficiaries is growing faster than 
those of the contributors.” (Rürup, 2003) 
A technical/political argument for the sustainability factor and against the demo-
graphic factor was that because demographic projections predicted an uneven de-
velopment (with big drops in one year and almost no changes in the next), the 
demographic factor might have led to the introduction of a “protection clause” for 
years with high drops (Krieger and Stowhase, 2009). There also was a political com-
ponent to the decision to use a different form of automatic stabilizing mechanism: 
during the 1999 election, the SPD had run on a platform against the demographic 
factor and presented itself as the party defending pensions. Having promised the 
electorate to undo the demographic factor, it would have been political suicide to 
have proposed the same mechanism when they were in power (Krupp, 1999). In the 
debate over the sustainability factor, the SPD argued that the losses are distributed 
evenly between workers and pensioners, and are therefore shared. Overall, the de-
bate over the sustainability factor was much more technical than the first one, 
mainly because all of the major parties except the PDS agreed that action needed to 
be taken. Thus while Germany did not move as far in the scope of its automatic sta-
bilizing mechanism as Sweden, it did put in place a mechanism that would facilitate 
automatic downward pension adjustments—so long as politicians could agree to 
keep their hands off. 
Rather than putting pension benefits on autopilot, however, the new pension 
formulae in fact coincided with several rounds of ad hoc policymaking. Most nota-
bly, in 2007 a CDU/CSU/SPD “grand coalition” enacted a gradual increase in the stan-
dard retirement (and thus the age for receiving “full” pension benefits) to 67 by the 
year 2029.  
Keeping their hands off mechanisms intended to reduce pension spending proved 
to be politically impossible in the wake of the global financial crisis and with the 
2009 elections approaching. The “grand” CDU/CSU/SPD government proved to be not 
so grand in its capacity to take shared blame for pre-scheduled cuts. On May 5th, 
2008, the Bundestag passed the “Law to adjust pensions in 2008” which had the ef-
fect of increasing pension payments by 1.1 percent, instead of the 0.46 percent in-
crease that would have resulted if the overall formula (wage growth plus the Riester 
and sustainability formulas) had been used without any adjustments. It also laid the 
basis for a more substantial increase in 2009, mainly by suspending the Riester Fac-
tor for two years – 2008 and 2009. The coalition government stated that this was 
only a temporary suspension of the Riester Factor and the government is still com-
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mitted to contribution rate caps described earlier (Lexis-Nexis, 2008). The overall 
costs of the measure were estimated to total 2.6 billion Euro in 2008 and 2009 (Sud-
deuutsche Zeitung, 2008).  
The law was supported by the grand coalition of SPD and CDU/CSU. The coalition 
argued that with this short term measure pensioners can participate in the eco-
nomic upswing, without jeopardizing the long term sustainability of the pension 
system (Bundesministerium fuer Arbeit und Soziales, 2009). Another argument that 
was brought up by proponents during the debate was the fact that pensions have 
been increased only very limited in past years, while overall costs of life were in-
creasing (Focus, 2008). The entire opposition – FDP, Green Party, and the Left Party -
voted against the law, but for differing reasons. The Left party criticized the in-
crease as “not enough” and launched an (unsuccessful) plan to increase pensions by 
4 percent, and abolish both the Riester and the sustainability factors. The FDP and 
the Green party, on the other hand, voted against it because the increase in pension 
payments would have to be covered by higher contributions by future generations. 
But there were also voices within the coalition parties stating fears that the in-
crease will have repercussions in the future. In the SPD, one of the most prominent 
critics was Rainer Wend, speaker for economic affairs of the party, who stated wor-
ries that the increase will add pressure to the working age population. In the CDU, 
the measure led to open criticism of Chancellor Merkel and the party establishment. 
Prominent opponents were CDU pension expert Jens Spahn and the leader of the 
“young group” of the Bundestag, Marco Wanderwitz. (Schweitzer, 2008). Other 
prominent critics, from both coalition and opposition parties, stated that the in-
crease of 1.1 percent was not enough given that pensions have been increased only 
marginally in most years leading to 2008. Horst Seehofer, then vice president of the 
CSU and now Minister President of Bavaria, argued that the Riester factor should be 
taken out of the pension formula permanently as it is “unfair” and decreases the 
transparency of the pension calculation. Rainer Bruederle from the FDP, then oppo-
sition leader and today Economic Minister in the CDU/FDP coalition, stated that the 
1.1 percent increase ‘barely covers the increase in VAT.” (Suddeutsche Zeitung 
2008). One of the most vocal critics of the pension increase was the employer’s as-
sociation (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, or BDA) who argued 
that it will lead to an increase in contribution payments after 2011 (Der Spiegel, 
2008). 
Controversy over pension funding formula continued in the spring of 2009, when 
pension payments increased by 2.41 percentage points in the East, and 3.38 in the 
Western Bundeslaender--the highest increase since 1994. The increase resulted 
from a number of factors in the pension adjustment formula, including a significant 
gross wage increase of 2.1 percent and the second year of the suspension of the Ri-
ester factor, which had already been set in 2008 as noted above (the two “sus-
pended” years of the Riester factor will be replaced in 2012 and 2013). But the pen-
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sion rise was also fueled by a 0.3 percent increase in the sustainability factor as em-
ployment growth shifted the contributor/beneficiary ratio. This change shows the 
potential volatility of an adjustment formula that is sensitive to short-term changes 
in employment. Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition emphasized the impor-
tance of promoting spending in the global financial crisis and justified the increase 
in pensions as part of the German “stimulus package” (Der Spiegel 2009). Criticism 
came mostly from outside the coalition parties. As usual, the Left party criticized 
that the increase as insufficient. On the other side, critics claimed that the suspen-
sion of the Riester factor for two years will lead to a contribution rate of 20.7 per-
cent by 2016, much higher than the government originally estimated (Branstetter, 
2009).  
In short, while the major parties remain committed to principles of the sustain-
ability index and adjusting pension spending to Germany’s changing demographic 
reality, they have not matched Sweden’s success in achieving a durable cartel that 
colludes in sustaining and supporting the operation of the automatic stabilizing 
mechanism. Conflict over the stabilizing mechanism and the associated Riester fac-
tor have become part of pension conflict in Germany rather than preventing pen-
sion conflict.  
Patterns and Lessons 
This paper has attempted to identify key design choices for automatic stabilizing 
mechanisms in public pension systems. In addition, I have tried to identify key po-
litical challenges in adopting implementing and sustaining those mechanisms. A 
number of common patterns emerge, as well as some lessons for other countries 
that may be considering adopting ASMs.  
The many options in design of automatic stabilizing mechanisms clearly have po-
litical implications as well as policy ones—indeed, politicians who fail to keep po-
litical feasibility in mind and overreach are likely to find disappointment in the 
short run or find their innovations in trouble in the medium-term.  
With regard to policy adoption, automatic stabilizing mechanisms were mostly 
adopted in procedurally protected arrangements (Canada and Sweden), although the 
nature of those arrangements differed. Reform initiatives in each of the three coun-
tries attempted to dampen partisan identification of reform proposals and (with 
varying degrees of success) to obtain broad cross-partisan buy-in and insulation 
from partisan and interest group attacks. This is not saying that the adoption proc-
ess sought to create (let alone succeeded in creating) social consensus on the stabi-
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lizing mechanism or the broader reform packages of which they were a key ele-
ment. Cartelization among key political actors and resigned acquiescence by key 
interest groups and the general public is a better description of what reform propo-
nents sought (Weaver, 2006) than consensus. If they were skilled political managers 
and fortunate in the electoral and policy constraints they faced, that is what they 
got. 
There is also a clear pattern with regard to “pay-offs” in reform packages that in-
cluded ASMs. A first thing to note is that in the Canadian, Swedish and German 
cases, automatic stabilizing mechanisms were adopted as components of very large 
pension reform packages that were seen as addressing major pension shortcomings, 
and ASMs were not the main focus of the public debate in most debates. Moreover, 
most ASM reforms included delay at least in the anticipated initial impact of those 
mechanisms if not their legal coming into force—that is policymakers did not try to 
use them to force painful retrenchment or tax increases immediately. This is hardly 
surprising: if one of the main objectives of ASMs is to distance politicians from po-
litical blame, they cannot be expected to enact a mechanism that will immediately 
lead the public to identify the loss imposition with the party or politicians who put 
it in place.  
With regard to framing perceptions, proponents of reforms invested substantial 
effort in focusing on the “sustainability” of their pension systems. While stressing 
the need to have pensions that would be available to later generations, politicians 
have tried to avoid offending the powerful senior voting bloc by demonizing 
“greedy geezers.” 
These patterns suggest several lessons that countries considering adoption of 
automatic stabilizing mechanisms in their own public pension systems. Certainly 
trying to develop a broad coalition and sense of “ownership” in the policy’s success, 
as well as a long-term commitment among multiple parties, is one strategic lesson 
that emerges from the cases. But as Martin Hering (2008) has argued in the German 
case, cartelization can take many forms, and formal agreements may be asking too 
much of potential veto players—informal cooperation may be all that can be ex-
tracted, and it may be sufficient to allow the adoption of ASMs. Of course, commit-
ments (especially informal ones) are not an ironclad guarantee against party defec-
tion, especially in a system like the United States where parties are themselves 
largely vehicles for individual political entrepreneurs, with weak policy identity and 
weak party discipline. The need to act when an election is still far away is a closely 
related lesson: building an agreement—tacit or formal--clearly takes time, and it is 
especially unlikely when parties are fearful of giving an electoral advantage to their 
opponents or losing such an advantage for themselves. 
Inclusion of an automatic balancing mechanism within a broader package that 
lowers its visibility is also likely to make an ASM more adoptable. Inclusion in a 
broader package also allows for the inclusion of “sweetener” provisions that may 
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neutralize potential opposition. Provisions to delay and phase in potential pain may 
also facilitate adoption of automatic stabilizing mechanisms—for example ASMs can 
start with an “alarm bell” and have a “fail safe” phase in later, use initial solvency 
projection periods that are relatively short and lengthen over time, and mecha-
nisms that spread out the adjustment rather than requiring cuts to be made all in 
one year. Such provisions may also help to sustain an ASM once it has been trig-
gered, as will be noted below. 
In terms of ASM implementation patterns, the highly trained bureaucracies in 
Canada, Sweden and Germany did not encounter major difficulties in setting up pro-
cedures under ASMs, but that is not a guarantee that such problems would not arise 
in countries where data, computer models and expertise are all in shorter supply. 
Only in the initial Canadian review is there some suggestion that governments may 
have interfered with projections and triggers, but once again the three countries 
that were the focus here are far from a random sample of nations in terms of bu-
reaucratic expertise and insulation. However, the German and Swedish cases sug-
gest that ad hoc interventions to mitigate potential benefit cuts can be a problem, 
especially during financial crisis and at the time of elections: ASMs are not as robust 
as their proponents had initially hoped. Special procedures such as legislative su-
permajority requirements might be useful in avoiding ad hoc interventions by poli-
ticians, but recent German and Swedish experience does not give much hope: once a 
proposal to ease ASM-imposed cuts is made by a large party, the incentives for 
other parties to climb on the bandwagon are strong. 
Evidence on another important aspect of ASM implementation, whether it leads 
to changes in retirement and savings behavior, is not very clear, and it may never 
be so. A major problem in evaluating such claims is precisely that adoption of ASMs 
generally has coincided with other changes in policy and in economic conditions 
that cannot be separated from the effects of the ASMs. Getting workers to increase 
their retirement savings and delaying retirement requires clear, consistent, and re-
peated messages—and probably more incentives and direction—than automatic 
stabilizing mechanisms alone provide. The policy implication is that governments 
should not rely on ASMs alone to revise behavior. Repeated messages like those that 
Swedish workers receive in their annual “Orange Envelope” detailing their likely 
pension benefits under varying retirement ages and conditions of economic growth 
are almost certainly a better strategy. Increases in the standard retirement age pro-
vide an even clearer signal. 
As noted above, the country case studies clearly suggest that the sustainability of 
automatic stabilization mechanisms should not be taken for granted. As anticipated, 
ASMs are politically sustainable when they aren’t used (Canada). But ASMs are prone 
to reversal or severe erosion after party change when they are enacted without op-
position party support, as shown in the Kohl government’s “demographic factor” in 
Germany. More importantly, ASMs are vulnerable to erosion over time, especially 
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when the losses that the ASM would impose are substantial (notably during financial 
crises), and when elections are impending.  
Overall, erosion of ASMs appears to be a more important concern than reversal. 
Given the political appeal of stopping ASM-triggered pension cutbacks or payroll tax 
increases, preserving the integrity of ASMs is most likely where the parties that 
initially supported their adoption continue to be able to engage in cartel-like behav-
ior with respect to pensions, or where the political system contains multiple veto 
points, or both. Continued cartel-like behavior in turn is more likely when there is 
no threat of defection or low threat of entry by new parties who see the elderly as a 
potential constituency. Spreading out the effects of ASMs on current beneficiaries 
over time so that they are less visible (e.g., not resulting in nominal cuts) is likely to 
make gradual erosion of benefit levels more acceptable, especially when those cuts 
are triggered as a result of financial crises (as with the recent Swedish cuts). Use of 
insulating mechanisms (e.g., supermajority requirements) to try to prevent erosion 
may also be useful. 
Overall, the analysis in this paper suggests that automatic stabilizing mecha-
nisms are no panacea for the problems of countries facing serious long-term pen-
sion financing problems. ASMs are perceived as devices to get politics out of pen-
sion politics, but they are inevitably devices that are creations of, vehicles for, and 
potentially victims of politics. At each stage of the policymaking process for ASMs—
design, enactment, implementation, and sustaining—they require a combination of 
substantive expertise with willingness on the part of multiple political actors to 
expend scarce political capital and cooperate with present and likely future adver-
saries rather than generating blame against those adversaries. Moreover, they re-
quire effective political strategizing in doing so. These are tough requirements, even 
under favorable institutional arrangements and political conditions. 
  
Table 1.  Policy Design Issues for Automatic Stabilizing Reforms 
 
KEY ISSUES OPTIONS 
 
Prospective or trend-based  
stabilization trigger 
 
 
• Triggers based on actual trends in employment, retirement, fertility, etc. 
• Triggers based on combination of trends and projections 
• Triggers based on projected developments in fertility, life expectancy, labor force participation, productivity, etc. 
 
Length of projection period  
(“crisis-preventing” versus  
“crisis-responding”) 
  
• Very long projection period (e.g., 75 years): usually makes demographic crisis appear more severe and requires bigger 
adjustments 
• Medium projection period (e.g., 25 years): usually makes demographic crisis appear less severe and requires smaller 
adjustments 
• Projection of next year’s fiscal requirements: requires no adjustment until crisis is imminent, but may require large 
and rapidly escalating cuts then to prevent immediate program insolvency 
 
Frequency of review • Annual review 
• Triennial review 
• Once-a-decade-review 
 
Speed and comprehesiveness  
of adjustment 
 
• Adjust system costs fully and immediately for changes in life-expectancy and economic conditions 
• Adjust system costs partially for changes in life-expectancy and economic conditions, phased in over several (e.g., 
three to ten) years 
• Government makes adjustments needed to prevent immediate program insolvency 
 
  
Table 1 continued 
 
KEY ISSUES OPTIONS 
 
Automaticity of stabilizing  
adjustments  
(“fail-safe” versus minimal  
“alarm bell”)  
 
• Adjustments occur automatically with no government action required; extraordinary majorities required to overturn 
them 
• Adjustments occur automatically with no government action required; can be overturned with normal legislative 
procedures 
• Adjustments occur automatically with no government action required; can be overturned or varied by executive  
action alone 
• Government must ratify adjustments for them to take effect, but is required to make up-or-down decision on  
adjustments 
• Government is required to take some affirmative action (e.g., submit a balancing proposal to the legislature), but no 
further action required 
• Government required to explain inaction when triggers are activated, but need not do anything 
• Government required to issue regular reports on financial status of pension system but no further action required 
 
Incidence of cost-bearing  
 
• Adjustment achieved entirely through benefit reductions for both current and future retirees and/or retirement age 
increases for future retirees 
• Adjustment achieved entirely through benefit reductions and/or retirement age increases for future retirees; current 
retirees held harmless 
• Adjustment split evenly between benefit retrenchment and financing increases 
• Adjustment achieved entirely through revenue enhancement (e.g., increases in payroll tax rate and/or payroll tax 
base) 
 
Protection from automatic  
cutbacks for low-income retirees 
• Strong poverty-preventing income floor for low-income retirees through means-tested or minimum benefit 
• Partial protection from cutbacks for low-income retirees 
• No protection from cutbacks for low-income retirees 
 
 
  
Table 2.  Challenges and Opportunities for Pension Automatic Stabilization Mechanisms 
 
Potential challenges and opportunities Potential strategic responses Potential risks and limitations of strategic responses 
DESIGN CRITERIA 
• Political challenge: automatic  
triggers offer politically-insulated 
way to balance revenues and  
expenditures and lower total  
pension burden 
• Institute strong “crisis-preventing” stabilizing 
 mechanisms 
• Weak, crisis-responding “alarm bells” may fail to 
achieve affordability objectives 
• Adequacy/Senior Welfare  
Challenge: Lowering of future  
pension benefits may especially 
hurt low earners 
• Use other tiers of pension system to shield low 
income pensioners from cutbacks 
• Expanded means-tested pension may undercut savings 
incentives  
• Expanded means-tested pension may undercut  
affordability objectives 
• Behavioral Change Challenge: Clear 
signals are needed to change  
workers’ savings and retirement 
behavior 
• Issue strong, clear and frequently updated  
information about impacts of mechanisms on  
future pensions  
• Clarity about likelihood of future benefit cuts  
undercuts probability of adoption 
• Lack of clarity about extent of future cutbacks could 
lead to inadequate behavioral responses by workers 
POLICY ADOPTION 
• Payoffs: Proposals for automatic 
stabilizing mechanisms mobilize 
concentrated opposition from  
seniors and/or labor organizations 
that may prevent program  
adoption 
? Institute long lead-times and transition rules so 
that most current retirees are unlikely to be  
heavily affected by cutbacks 
? Postpone initial impact until after next election 
? Have gradual phase-ins so that cutbacks are less 
visible 
? Improve benefit floors so that low-income retirees 
are shielded from ASM cuts 
? Compromises made to win adoption of stabilization 
mechanisms undercut program effectiveness or delay 
their impact, and prove difficult to phase out 
? NDC-based systems impose substantial concentrated 
costs where current system has progressive benefit 
structure 
• Perceptions of Entitlement: Auto-
matic cutbacks may be perceived 
as unfair, especially to retirees and 
near-retirees 
 
? Reframe issue in terms of need to maintain fiscal 
solvency for future generations  
? Counter-framing by potential opponents in terms of 
senior welfare is likely to be broadly attractive to  
voters 
  
Table 2 continued 
 
Potential challenges and opportunities Potential strategic responses Potential risks and limitations of strategic responses 
? Procedures-Institutional veto 
points: Political systems with  
multiple veto points make it easy 
to block adoption of strong ASMs 
 
?  Try to obtain broad multi-party agreement using 
closed-door negotiations to weaken incentives to 
defect from agreement and generate blame against 
ASM proponents 
? Opposition parties lack political incentives to forego 
blame-generating opportunities by criticizing potential 
automatic cutbacks through ASMs, especially in lead-up 
to election 
? Procedures-Few venue-shopping 
opportunities since ASMs are likely 
to require legislation 
? Utilize or create politically insulated decision-
making procedures in formulating and adopting 
stabilization mechanisms 
 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
? Implementing agency may lack 
adequate time, financial or  
organizational resources to achieve 
objectives 
? Provide adequate lead time to allow program to 
plan and build administrative capacity 
? Provide adequate funding and personnel to meet 
technical needs 
? Politicians often want immediate results from policy 
initiatives 
? Politicians may interfere with 
calculation of triggers or required 
program adjustments 
? Increase independence of agencies charged with 
calculating triggers or outsource production of  
data 
? Independence harder to enforce where civil service 
protections and professional norms are weak 
? Politicians may intervene to block 
or modify implementation of au-
tomatic adjustments once they  
have been announced 
? Phase in effects of automatic adjustments over 
several years so that impacts are less visible and 
politicians are less tempted to intervene 
? Slower phase-in of contribution rate increases  
requires higher long-term equilibrium contribution 
rate 
? Program clientele fail to adjust 
savings and labor supply because 
of unclear signals about degree of 
policy change 
? Send clear, repeated signals through annual  
statements with several scenarios, etc. 
? Sending clear signals about level of cutbacks under 
ASM before adoption may prevent adoption; similar 
signals after adoption may create a backlash, leading to 
erosion or reversal 
POLICY SUSTAINABILITY 
? Political elites who pushed reform 
may lose office, leading to reversal 
of reform  
? Create multiple veto point and super-majority  
requirements for enacting pension reform that 
make it difficult to reverse or erode 
? Political systems with weak executive agenda control 
and few veto points will have difficulties in preventing 
repeal of ASM insulation mechanism 
? Politically powerful groups may 
press for exempting their group 
from ASM ex post 
? Frame issue as one of fairness—no group should 
be exempt from reform 
 
 
  
Table 3.  Automatic Stabilizing Mechanisms in Four Countries 
 
Provision United States  
(Bismarckian Lite social  
insurance pension with trust 
fund) 
Sweden 
(NDC pension tier) 
Germany  
(DB social insurance pension 
with quasi-NDC stabilization 
factor) 
Canada  
(Bismarckian Lite social  
insurance pension with trust 
fund) 
 
Length of projection 
period (“crisis-
preventing” versus 
“crisis-responding”) 
 
Crisis-responding: 75 year 
projection period, but  
stabilization mechanism 
applies only to next year 
 
Crisis-preventing: Projected 
lifetime of each cohort in 
labor market 
 
Crisis-preventing: ratio of 
pensioners to labor force 
 
Crisis-preventing: 60 years 
Comprehensiveness  
of adjustment 
Weak: shift in calculating 
benefit inflation adjustment 
from CPI to lower of increases 
in wages or prices; no  
adjustment for changes in life 
expectancy or retiree/worker 
ratio 
Strong crisis-preventing: 
Notional account balances and 
benefits adjusted for wage 
growth and overall economic 
growth, before and after  
retirement 
Strong crisis-preventing:  Moderate crisis-preventing: 
Speed of adjustment Immediate Three years (initially one 
year) 
One year Three years 
Automaticity of  
stabilizing adjustments 
(“fail-safe” versus 
minimal “alarm bell”) 
Fully automatic Fully automatic Fully automatic Fully automatic 
Cost bearing (balance 
between expenditure 
reductions and  
revenue enhancements 
in adjustments) 
Entirely through  
expenditures 
Entirely through  
expenditures 
Largely through expenditures Split entirely between  
expenditures and revenue 
increases 
Protection from  
automatic cutbacks for 
low-income retirees 
Weak protection through 
highly restricted and low-
benefit Supplemental  
Security Income 
Strong protection through 
Guarantee Pension 
 Strong protection through 
universal Old Age Security 
and Guaranteed Income Sup-
plement 
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